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ABSTRACT
This paper extends Hall’s (1988) methodology to analyse imperfections in both the
product and the labour market for firms in the Belgian manufacturing industry over
the period 1988-1995. We investigate the heterogeneity in price-cost mark-up and
workers’ bargaining power parameters among 18 sectors within the manufacturing
industry as well as the relationship between both parameters. Using a sample of
more than 7 000 firms, our GMM results indicate that ignoring imperfection in the
labour market leads to an underestimation in the price-cost margin evaluated at
perfect competition in the labour market. These findings are confirmed in the
sectoral analysis. Sectors with higher workers’ bargaining power typically show
higher price-cost margins.
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1.     INTRODUCTION
Intense research in industrial organisation has led to the design of more and more refined
methods to assess price-setting behaviour of firms in various environments (see Bresnahan, 1989
and Schmalensee, 1989 for surveys). However, the approach has generally remained restrictive, in
the sense that it has ignored the possibility that inputs, and particularly labour, are not priced
competitively. The fact that unions bargain over wages and hence over a share of the firm’s non-
competitive rents, necessitates the integration of labour market variables when investigating profit
margins. Labour economists on the other hand have devoted effort to test for imperfect competition
in the labour market. Most papers deal with the determination of wages and employment in the
presence of trade unions. The broad body of papers examines the effect of industry or firm
performance on wages within a collective bargaining framework1 and strongly supports the rent-
sharing hypothesis. But a similar criticism applies to these studies, i.e. they solely focus on
imperfections in the labour market, assuming perfect competition in the product market.2 Only a
few studies (Bughin, 1996; Crépon et al., 2002; Neven et al., 2002; Schroeter, 1988) have
considered the possibility of imperfections in both product and factor markets, thereby taking into
account that wages are no longer exogenous in econometric tests of product market power.
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between the degree of labour market
imperfections and the price-cost margin3 of firms in the Belgian manufacturing industry over the
period 1988-1995. We analyse how the distribution of the surplus available for sharing between the
workers and the firm as well as the size of that surplus are related to union bargaining power.
Methodologically, we follow Crépon et al. (2002). Their methodology is a natural extension
of Hall’s (1988) approach, which in turn originated from Solow’s (1957) well-known article on
estimating total factor productivity as a measure of technical change. Besides deviating from
perfect competition in the product market, we allow for the possibility that wages are bargained off
the labour demand curve, according to an Efficient Bargaining model. Relaxing the condition that
labour is priced competitively has important implications for the derivation of the Solow residual.
More precisely, it can be shown that the Solow residual can be decomposed into four components:
(1) a mark-up of price over marginal cost component, (2) a scale factor, (3) a factor reflecting
union bargaining power and (4) the rate of technical change. This extended approach has the
advantage that no measurement of the user cost of capital is needed to estimate the firms’ price-cost
                                                          
1 See e.g. Blanchflower et al. (1996), Dobbelaere (2004), Goos and Konings (2001), Hildreth and Oswald (1997) and Teulings and
Hartog (1998).
2 The necessary conditions for a union to be able to appropriate any rents in a perfectly competitive product market without driving the
firm out of existence are (1) that the union acts as a monopolist in the supply of labour and (2) that there is a fixed number of firms in the
perfectly competitive industry (Booth, 1995).
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mark-up. Neither is a measurement of the alternative wage required to estimate the bargaining
power of the union. In addition to testing simultaneously for imperfections in the product and the
labour market, this approach provides an alternative test, based on the labour share, of the Right-
To-Manage versus the Efficient Bargaining model.
We take advantage of a rich firm-level dataset covering the entire Belgian manufacturing
industry over the period 1988-1995. Our analysis allows us to make various contributions to the
literature. First, whereas the analysis of Crépon et al. (2002) is limited to the manufacturing
industry as a whole, our large sample enables us to examine the important issue of heterogeneity in
both price-cost mark-up and union bargaining power parameters. More specifically, we (1) study
the heterogeneity among sectors and (2) investigate the relationship between union bargaining
power and price-cost mark-ups. To our knowledge, the interaction between product market and
labour market imperfections at the sectoral level has not been investigated before. Second, in
contrast to most of the literature following Hall (1988), we estimate market power using a firm-
level dataset. In addition to increasing the reliability and the efficiency of the estimates and to
taking into account firm-heterogeneity within sectors, the use of firm-level data allows us to
construct good instruments. We apply the Arellano and Bond (1991) Generalised Method of
Moments (GMM) technique. Our main findings are the following. First, our results confirm the
conclusion of Crépon et al. (2002) that ignoring imperfect competition in the labour market leads to
an underestimation of the price-cost margin at the manufacturing industry level. Our sectoral
analysis shows that this conclusion also holds at the sectoral level. Second, focusing on the cross-
section dimension enables us to reach conclusions in terms of interdependencies between the
estimated price-cost margins and the estimated union bargaining power. We find that sectors with
higher union bargaining power typically show higher price-cost margins. The positive correlation
between the two estimated parameters can be interpreted in two ways. Our favoured interpretation
is that labour market imperfections affect product market imperfections in the long run. The
reasoning is that strong unions reduce the share of the rents left to the firm, thereby driving firms
out of the market and increasing the degree of product market imperfections. According to this
interpretation, more powerful unions do not only increase the fraction of the product rents going to
labour but also the size of total rents available for sharing between the workers and the firm.
Another interpretation runs from product market performance to labour market performance,
capturing the standard effect in the trade union literature. The reasoning is that unions are most
likely to form in firms where rents can be extracted, which is most likely to happen if there is
imperfect competition in the product market.
                                                                                                                                                                               
3 Throughout the paper, the price-cost margin refers to the ‘hypothetical’ price-cost margin, i.e. the price-cost margin evaluated at
perfect competition in the labour market (for technical details, see section 2).
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In the remainder, we first describe our theoretical framework (section 2). Section 3 surveys
the existing literature on the effect of unions on economic performance. In section 4, we outline our
empirical model. Section 5 presents the dataset and some summary statistics. Section 6 discusses
the estimation method and confronts the theoretical hypotheses with Belgian firm-level data.
Section 7 summarises and interprets the results.
2.     THEORETICAL  FRAMEWORK
2.1.    Imperfection in the Output Market, Perfect Competition in the Labour Market
We start from a standard production function it it it it itQ F N M KΘ ( , , )  where i  is a firm index,
t  a time index, N  is labour, M  is material input and K  is capital. Θ  is an index of total factor
productivity which is allowed to vary across firms and over time. This shift variable is modelled as
the sum of a deterministic component and a random component, i.e. i t itit
a a uΘ Ae ,   where ia  is a
firm-specific time-invariant component, ta  represents productivity shocks common to all firms in a
given year and itu  is a random component with mean zero capturing transitory and idiosyncratic
differences in productivity.
Letting it it it itn m kq , , ,  and itθ  be the logarithms of it it it itQ N M K, , ,  and itΘ , we can write the
logarithmic differentiation of the production function as:
       
Q, N Q, M Q, K
it it it it it it it itε ε εq n m k θ (1)
where, using the Tornquist approximation, the time log-derivatives x  ( kx q n m θ, , , , ) are
replaced by the year to year log-changes ( 1t tx x  ) and the production function log-derivatives, i.e.
the elasticities it it
Q, J
itε q j    ( j kn m, , ), by their averages over adjacent years
 1 1
1
2 i t i t it it
Q, J
itε q j q j, ,       .
Under perfect competition, it is well known since Solow that itq  can be decomposed as
follows:
          Nit Mit Kitit it it it itq n m k θ (2)
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where Jit itJit
it it
P J
J N M K
P Q
( , , )    is the share of inputs in total revenue. Consistent with the
Tornquist approximation, these shares are computed as the averages over adjacent years.
Under imperfect competition in the product market and perfect competition in the input
markets, Eq. (2) becomes (Hall, 1988):
           it Nit Mit Kitit it it it itq n m k θ (3)
where  itit
Qit
P
C
 is the mark-up of price over marginal cost evaluated at the competitive wage level.
Assuming constant returns to scale,  i.e.  it Nit Mit Kit 1       , and rearranging terms,
another way to write Eq. (3) is:
    
 
1
1
1
( )
( )
( )
it Nit it Mit it Nit Mit it
it Nit it it Mit it it it
it it it it it
q n m k
n k m k θ
q k θ
            
             
       
(4)
where µ 1β
µ
- -
 
it Qit it
it
it it
P C
P
 is the price-cost margin.
Under increasing or decreasing returns to scale,
 1 or 1
Qit it
it it Mit it it it
it it Nit Mit Kit it
Qit it Qit itC C Q C
w N P M r K
Q Q
            
where γ can be higher than 0 (increasing returns to scale) or lower than 0 (decreasing returns to
scale) and 1+γ  is the local scale elasticity measure.
Eq. (4) can therefore easily be generalised as:
    
 
1
1
1
            
                

         

( )
( )
( )
it Nit it Mit it Nit Mit it
it Nit it it Mit it it it it it
it
it it it it it it
it
q n m k
n k m k k θ
q k k θ
(5)
This equation shows that the Solow Residual can be decomposed into (1) a price-cost mark-up
component, (2) a scale factor and (3) a technological term or true total factor productivity growth
(    it t ita u ).
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2.2.    Imperfection in both the Output and the Labour Market
Relaxing the assumption that labour is priced competitively has important implications for
the derivation of the Solow residual. To see this, assume that the union and the firm are involved in
an Efficient Bargaining procedure, with both wages  w  and employment  N  as the subject of
agreement (McDonald and Solow, 1981). Both parties maximise their respective utility during the
bargaining process. The union is risk neutral and its objective function is specified in a utilitarian
form:     aU w N Nw N N w, -  , where N  is union membership  0 N N   and aw w  is the
alternative wage (i.e. a weighted average of the alternative market wage and the unemployment
benefit). The firm’s utility equals its profits  , with    w N R N w N F,    , where PQR 
stands for total revenue  0NR
"
 , P  for the output price, Q  for output and F  for all other costs
associated with production. For simplicity, we assume that labour is the only variable input for the
firm. Hence, F  represents fixed costs. It can be shown that this assumption on the fixed nature of
inputs other than labour does not affect the bargaining outcome provided that union preferences do
not depend on those inputs (Bughin, 1996).  Moreover, we normalise for the present by assuming
that Q N .
The bounds of the bargaining range are given by the minimum acceptable utility levels for
both parties. The threat point for the union is the alternative wage aw . If no revenue accrues to the
firm when negotiation breaks down, the firm’s fall-back utility equals F . The outcome of the
bargaining is the asymmetric generalised Nash solution to:
    1
w N
a aNNw N N w w R wN


    
,
max        (6)
where  0 1,  represents the union’s bargaining power.
Maximisation of Eq. (6) with respect to the wage rate  w  gives the following equation:
1 a
R
w w
N
   ( ) (7)
Maximising Eq. (6) with respect to employment  N  leads to the following first-order
condition:
1
N
N N
R R NR wN
w R w R
N N

  

 
 
  
      (8)
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From Eq. (8), it follows that unions extract a rent from bargaining, expressed as a premium
over the marginal revenue of labour  NR .
By solving simultaneously both first-order conditions, we obtain an expression for the
contract curve, which results from the tangency between iso-profit curves and union indifference
curves: N aR w . This equation shows that the employment level depends on the alternative wage
 aw  but not on the negotiated wage  w  (Andersen and Sorensen, 2004; Blanchard and Giavazzi,
2003; Brown and Ashenfelter, 1986). It also follows that the contract curve outcome is to the right
of the labour demand curve. The first-order condition related to optimal employment [Eq. (8)]
shows the extent to which the bargaining outcome is off the labour demand curve.
In section 2.1, we defined   as the price-cost margin evaluated at the competitive wage
level, i.e. Q
P C
P

  . Using the contract curve outcome, we can also write   in this setting as:
.a N
R N w R R N
R N R
 
    Hence, Eq. (8) can be rewritten as:
                                                                        N
R
w R
N
                                                    (9)
Eq. (9) shows that the union premium is part of the price-cost margin ( ), set by a profit-
maximising firm facing an exogenously determined wage equal to NR ( aw  in our case).
4 Hence,
wage rents under Efficient Bargaining depend on the imperfect market structure in both the output
market (as reflected by the firm’s price-cost margin  ) and the labour market (as reflected by the
union’s bargaining power  ). In other words, the positive union wage premium depends on the size
of the surplus available for sharing between the workers and the firm as well as on the fraction of
the surplus going to the workers. Both these factors are in turn related to the collective bargaining
structure, the market structure and the technology of the firm.
Dropping the normalisation assumption  Q N  and defining the mark-up parameter   as
the inverse of the elasticity of revenue with respect to output, i.e. 
1
Q
Q
R
R


 
  
where QR  is the
                                                          
4 Since in the Efficient Bargaining model, marginal revenue  
Q
R equals marginal cost  
Q
C  evaluated at the competitive levels of
output and wages, the mark-up has to be interpreted as a mark-up of prices over marginal costs evaluated at the competitive wage level,
i.e. 
Q a
P
C Q w
 
( , )
 with 
a
w  the competitive wage and Q  the competitive output level (see also Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003).
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marginal revenue, we can express the marginal revenue of labour as: NN
PQ
R 

 with NQ  the
physical marginal product of labour. Using this expression for NR  in Eq. (8), the efficient
bargaining labour share is written as:
1
,
( )
Q N
N
wN
PQ
  

   

(10)
Under the generalised Nash solution, the equilibrium labour share  N  is hence a linear
function of the elasticity of output with respect to labour  ,Q N . The efficient bargaining labour
share equals unity if 1  , i.e. if the union has all the power to capture the firm’s product rents.
Rewriting Eq. (10) as: 1
1
, ( )Q N N N

     
 
, an extra term can be added to Eq. (5):
    
  
    
1
1
1
1
1 1
1
( )
( )
( )
it Nit it Mit it Nit Mit it
it Nit it it Mit it it
it
it it it Nit it it it
it
it it
it it it it Nit it it it it
it it
q n m k
n k m k
k n k θ
q k k n k θ
            
            

          
 
 
 	             	 
  
(11)
From Eq. (11), it follows that the Solow residual can now be decomposed into four
components: (1) a mark-up of price over marginal cost component, (2) a scale factor, (3) a factor
reflecting union bargaining power and (4) the rate of technical change. Remember that the mark-up
has to be interpreted as a mark-up of prices over marginal costs evaluated at the competitive wage
level.
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3.     EXISTING LITERATURE
The estimation of equations (5) and (11) allows us to shed light on the relationship between
the degree of labour market imperfections and the price-cost margins of firms, evaluated at perfect
competition in the labour market. This enables us to conclude whether labour market and product
market characteristics are correlated and -more specifically- whether imperfections in both markets
are likely to go hand in hand. Before elaborating on that issue, we survey the existing theoretical
and empirical literature on the effect of labour market imperfections on product market
performance in this section. First, we discuss the union-productivity effect. Second, the impact of
unions on firm profitability is considered. Finally, we focus on the effect of unions on dynamic
efficiency, such as R&D investment and innovative activity. The resulting hypotheses will be our
point of reference for some of the interpretations of our empirical results in section 7.
3.1.    Impact of Unions on Productivity
Productivity changes occur through technological changes, changes in technical efficiency
and changes in scale efficiency. Theoretically, unions can raise productivity through various
channels. First, firms may respond to the increased labour costs by increasing the capital intensity
and employing better-quality labour, hence increasing labour productivity. Second, productivity
improvements can result from the fact that unions can cause a ‘shock effect’, inducing managers to
change production methods and to adopt more efficient personnel policies (Slichter et al., 1960).
Third, unions can reduce staff turnover (Addison and Barnett, 1982; Freeman, 1976). Fourth,
unions can stress seniority rules (Rees, 1989). Fifth, unions can improve worker morale and
motivation (Leibenstein, 1966). Sixth, unions can improve communication between workers and
management (Dworkin and Ahlburg, 1985). In the literature, the first channel is called the
monopoly union effect. Note that the gain in productivity resulting from this effect is socially
harmful because it is caused by inefficient allocation of resources. The other channels are called the
union voice/ institutional response effects. The gain in productivity resulting from these effects is
socially desirable because it is induced by improved efficiency (DeFina, 1983; Freeman and
Medoff, 1979). Negative productivity effects can arise from strike activity and non-cooperative
behaviour (Caves, 1980; Flaherty, 1987). Second, unions may decrease productivity by
discouraging investment in physical and intangible assets (Grout, 1984). Third, unions may force
firms to adopt inefficient work practices (Pencavel, 1977).
Using various datasets for a number of sectors and countries and different econometric
techniques, the empirical literature has produced mixed results. Following Brown and Medoff
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(1978) [US], evidence in favour of positive union-productivity effects has been derived in several
studies.5 Other studies however provide evidence of a negative union-productivity effect.6 Recent
empirical evidence for the UK shows no differences in productivity of union compared to non-
union workplaces (Pencavel, 2002).
A separate part of the empirical literature has focused on the effect of unions on productivity
growth.7 Using US data, Kendrick and Grossman (1980) find a negative union-productivity growth
effect from 1948 to 1966 but a positive effect from 1967 to 1976. Several studies provide evidence
of a negative effect of unions on productivity growth (see Hirsch and Link, 1984 and Mansfield,
1980 for the US; and Maki, 1983 for Canada). A positive impact of unions on productivity growth
has been found by Gregg et al. (1993) [UK] and Phipps and Sheen (1994) [Australia].
The empirical studies mentioned above follow the traditional production function approach,
i.e. they investigate the effect of unions on productivity assuming that there is technical efficiency
in the production process. Only a few studies have assessed the union-productivity effect by
estimating a stochastic production frontier, hence allowing for technical inefficiency. Among them,
Byrnes et al. (1988) and Cavalluzzo and Baldwin (1993) find a positive union-productivity effect
using US data whereas Doucouliagos and Laroche (2002) show a negative union-productivity
effect for France.8
3.2.    Impact of Unions on Profitability
Theoretically, the rent-seeking view of unions focuses on the increased labour costs and the
associated impact on labour allocations (Lewis, 1963). If there is no offsetting productivity effect,
unions will depress profitability.
Whereas empirically, no robust conclusion can be reached concerning the union-productivity
effect, the empirical studies on the effect of unions on profitability conclude that unions decrease
profitability on average (see Addison and Hirsch, 1989; Becker and Olson, 1992 and Kleiner, 2001
for good surveys for the US; Benson, 1994 and Tachibanaki and Noda, 2000 for Japan; Machin and
Stewart, 1996; Menezes-Filho,1997; Metcalf, 1993 and Stewart, 1990 for the UK). This conclusion
is invariant to the profit measure used, to the use of sectors or firms as the unit of observation and
to the time period under investigation. The studies differ, however, in their conclusions about the
                                                          
5 See Allen (1984, 1986, 1988), Clark (1980a, 1980b), Freeman and Medoff (1983) and Schuster (1983) for the US; Coutrot (1996) for
France; Huebler and Jirjahn (2001) for Germany; Maki (1983) for Canada; and Benson (1994), Morishima (1991) and Muramatsu
(1984) for Japan.
6 See Bemmels (1987), Grady and Hall (1985), Hirsch and Addison (1986) for the US; Schnabel (1991) for Germany; Brunello (1992)
and Tachibanaki and Noda (2000) for Japan; Davis and Caves (1987), Edwards (1987), Metcalf (1993), Moreton (1999) and Pencavel
(1977) for the UK; and Crockett et al. (1992), Phipps and Sheen (1994) and Wooden (1990) for Australia.
7 Unions may have a positive effect on productivity while inducing lower productivity growth. This could arise, for example, when
unions increase efficiency but at the same time have a negative impact on technical change by retarding investment.
8 For France, the negative effect is reversed, however, for firms that adopt many Human Resources Management practices (HRM).
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magnitude of the negative union-profitability effect (Hirsch, 1997).9 Recent evidence for the US,
however, shows a positive relationship between unionisation and profitability (Batt and Welbourne,
2002). Using UK data, Machin and Stewart (1996) and Menezes-Filho (1997) show that the
negative union-profitability effect has weakened considerably over the 1980s.10 Recent empirical
work for the UK finds no overall relationship between union presence and profitability by the end
of the 1990s (Addison and Belfield, 2000; Bryson and Wilkinson, 2002 and McNabb and
Whitfield, 2000).11
3.3.    Impact of Unions on Innovative Investment Activity
Theoretically, unions can influence investment both positively and negatively. In the
traditional model, higher union wages induce firms to move up and along their labour demand
curve by decreasing employment, hiring high-quality workers and increasing the capital-to-labour
ratio. Investment in (in)tangible capital can either decrease or increase depending on the magnitude
of positive substitution versus negative scale effects.12 The first new generation of theories focusing
on the impact of unionisation on investment highlights union rent-seeking behaviour which
depresses R&D spending and investment. In this setting, unions appropriate some of the quasi-rents
earned on long-lived capital. Hence, union wage increases act as a tax on capital that lowers the net
rate of return on investment (hold-up problem). In response, firms reduce investment in innovative
and physical capital (Baldwin, 1983; Grout, 1984; Hirsch and Link, 1987; Hirsch and Prasad, 1995
and Malcomson, 1997). The second new generation of theories has qualified the underinvestment
outcome by considering oligopolistic competition between firms in the final goods market (Tauman
and Weiss, 1987; Ulph and Ulph, 1994; 1998; 2001). In this setting, R&D is undertaken for
strategic reasons by firms that are competing with each other. Tauman and Weis (1987) consider a
duopoly where only one firm is unionised. In their model the unionised firm, facing a higher wage
level, can have more incentives to invest. Using an efficient bargaining model, Ulph and Ulph
(1998, 2001) show that the relationship between union strength and R&D is inverse U-shaped if the
union cares a lot about employment.
The earliest empirical evidence supporting the union tax model has been provided by
Connolly et al. (1986) for the US. Hirsch (1991) distinguishes direct and indirect effects of unions
on investment. The direct effect arises from the union tax on returns to capital. The indirect effect
                                                          
9 Almost all the studies treat union density as exogenous. The few studies that take into account that unionisation and profitability should
in fact be determined simultaneously, find larger estimates of the impact of unions on profitability (Hirsch, 1991; Voos and Michel,
1986). This is because unions are most likely to organise and survive in firms that are most profitable.
10 The authors conclude that the negative union-profitability effect only survives if unions are strong and if there is weak competition in
the product market.
11 Metcalf (2003) also argues that the union-profitability effect is highly dependent on the degree of competition in the product market.
In case of monopolistic competition, unions still have a negative effect on profitability.
12 Note that the traditional on-the-demand curve approach is, however, inadequate for two reasons. First, both the union and the firm
prefer settlements off the labour demand curve. Second, the union wage increase is considered as an independent increase in the cost of
labour relative to capital (Hirsch, 1997).
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stems from the increased financing costs owing to depressed profits. For the US, he finds a
negative effect of unions on capital investment which is doubled when the profit effect is taken into
account. These findings are confirmed for R&D investment although the indirect effect is only
modest in that case. Similar conclusions are provided by Allen (1988), Bronars and Deere (1993),
Bronars et al. (1994) for the US; Betts and Odgers (1997) for Canada; Addison et al. (1993) for
Germany and Denny and Nickell (1992) for the UK. In contrast, Benson (1994) provides evidence
in favour of the traditional model, i.e. unionisation seems to increase capital investment in Japan.
Schedlitzki (2002) concludes that there is no relationship between unionisation and investment in
capital and R&D in Germany. Using British data, Ulph and Ulph (1988 ) find that unionisation has
a positive effect on R&D investment in low-tech industries but a negative effect in high-tech
industries. Addison and Wagner (1994) provide evidence of a positive impact of unions on R&D
investment in British low-tech industries. They argue, however, that the positive effect is due to
endogeneity of unionisation. Menezes-Filho et al. (1998) find a negative effect of unions on R&D
spending in the UK but this effect basically disappears when they control for technological
opportunities in the industry and cohort effects. Moreover, using an ex-post efficient bargaining
model13 they provide evidence of a quadratic relationship between R&D expenditure and union
density, i.e. R&D rises with union density up to a threshold and then falls. This empirical finding
supports the second new generation of theories investigating the effect of unions on investment.
4.     EMPIRICAL MODEL
Rewriting:                       1( )it Nit it Mit it Nit Mit itq n m k            
as itSR  and imposing that 1
1
    

it ,  it ,   it  and   it , we are able to estimate four
different specifications.
Model 1 : constant returns to scale and no bargaining ( 0  , 0  )
        1it it it itSR q k θ       ( )                                                                            (12)
Model 2 : increasing or decreasing returns to scale and no bargaining ( 0  )
        1it it it it itSR q k k θ        

 
 
 
( )                                                               (13)
                                                          
13 An ex-post efficient bargaining model refers to the case where the firm and the union bargain over wages and employment in the
second stage conditional on the R&D decision which is taken by the firm in the first stage.
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Model 3 : constant returns to scale and bargaining ( 0  )
        1 1
1it it it Nit it it it
SR q k n k θ           
 
 ( )( ) ( )                                              (14)
Model 4 : increasing or decreasing returns to scale and bargaining
                  1 1
1it it it it Nit it it it
SR q k k n k θ               
	  
 
 
 
( )( ) ( )                              (15)
where     .it t itθ a u  In the estimations, ta  is captured by year dummies and itu  represents
the stochastic element of productivity growth.
5.     DATA
We use an unbalanced panel of the entire population of Belgian firms in the manufacturing
industry over the period 1988-1995. All variables are taken from annual company accounts which
are collected by the National Bank of Belgium (NBB). We use real gross sales as a proxy for
production ( Q ). Labour ( N ) refers to the average number of employees in each firm for each year
and material input ( M ) refers to the quantity of materials employed. The capital stock ( K ) is
proxied by tangible fixed assets at historic cost minus depreciation. Nominal variables are deflated
by the three-digit producer price index which we have drawn from the National Statistical Office
(NIS).
In the initial dataset, the number of firms is approximately 19 000 per year. For the
estimates, we only include firms for which we have at least three consecutive observations for all
variables, ending up with 7 044 firms. Table 1 reports the means, standard deviations and first and
third quartiles of the included data for our main variables. The average growth rate of real firm
output for the overall sample is 2.9% per year over the period 1988-1995 whereas the
corresponding average manufacturing industry real output growth rate amounts to 4.2%. Capital
has decreased at an average annual growth rate of 2.4%, materials have increased at an average
annual growth rate of 3% and labour is stable over the period. The Solow residual or the
conventional measure of total factor productivity has increased at an average annual growth rate of
1.2%. As expected for firm-level data, the dispersion of all these variables is considerably large.
For example, TFP growth is smaller than -2.9% for the first quartile of firms and higher than 5.3%
for the fourth quartile.
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Table 1   Summary Statistics
VARIABLES 1988-1995
         Mean      St. Dev.   Q1 Q3
Real firm output growth rate ∆q  0.029 0.173 -0.060 0.123
Real industry output growth rate  ind∆q  0.042 0.164 -0.028 0.107
Labour growth rate ∆n  0.005 0.154 -0.029 0.041
Capital growth rate ∆k -0.024 0.214 -0.156 0.097
Materials growth rate ∆m  0.030 0.198 -0.075 0.139
Labour share N  in nominal output  0.272 0.153  0.158 0.361
Materials share M  in nominal output  0.629 0.175  0.516 0.753
Solow residual SR (TFP)  0.012 0.093 -0.029 0.053
∆(q - k)  0.053 0.227 -0.092 0.210
N
(α - 1) ∆(n - k) -0.020 0.170 -0.124 0.077
Note: (1)  For all variables, the number of observations is 35518.
          (2)  
it Nit it Mit it Nit Mit it
SR =∆q - α ∆n - α ∆m - (1- α - α ) ∆k .
6.     ESTIMATION METHOD AND RESULTS
6.1.    Estimation Technique
Since transitory productivity shocks ( itu ) might affect the level of factor inputs to the extent
that the shock becomes part of the firm’s information set before input choices are determined,
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates would be inconsistent and biased. Moreover, the
production price is endogenous to our models since the product market is imperfectly competitive
and the production price depends on strategic quantity choices made by firms. Hence, we treat all
current dated firm-specific variables as potentially endogenous.
To take into account the endogeneity problems, we estimate the models using the
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) technique for panel data as advocated by Arellano and
Bond (1991). This estimation method is a more robust and efficient extension of the first-difference
Instrumental Variable method suggested for dynamic fixed effects models by Anderson and Hsiao
(1982). The reason is that it utilises the moment conditions around the error term to provide
additional instruments.
Under the assumption that current random shocks are uncorrelated with past values of firm-
level regressors, we use lagged values of ∆n, ∆m and ∆k  from (t-2) and before as instruments.14,15
                                                          
14 Since all variables are expressed as growth rates, permanent shocks are not considered.
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Crépon et al. (2002) and Klette and Griliches (1996) have adopted a similar approach. The validity
of the use of 2-period lagged instruments depends critically on the errors in the level equation being
serially uncorrelated. Absence of second-order serial correlation in the first-difference error term is
hence needed. We therefore present tests of this null hypothesis using a statistic developed in
Arellano and Bond (1991) which has a standard normal distribution. The exogeneity of the
instruments with respect to the error term is further tested by the Sargan test statistic which is
distributed as chi-squared. The GMM estimator is also robust to heteroskedasticity.16 In addition to
using IV estimation techniques, we also include time dummies to capture possible unobservable
aggregate shocks and productivity shocks common to all firms in a given year ( ta ). By taking the
first (logarithmic) difference of the production function, we control for individual firm effects ( ia ).
As a consequence, our parameter estimates are consistent even if ia  were correlated with
regressors.
Estimation is carried out using the Dynamic Panel Data program developed by Arellano and
Bond (1988), which works with the GAUSS programming language.
6.2.    General Results
First, we ignore potential heterogeneity in the price-cost mark-up and the bargaining power
parameters among sectors and estimate equations (12)-(15) for the manufacturing industry as a
whole over the period 1988-1995. The two-step estimates are reported in Table 2. The first part of
Table 2 gives the estimated values of the coefficients for the regressors entering the models. Part 2
presents the structural parameters computed from the reduced form parameters and the third part
provides specification tests.
The specification tests do not show evidence against our estimates. Absence of second-order
serial correlation cannot be rejected, which justifies our use of twice lagged instruments. The
Sargan test does not reject their joint validity. As to the estimated coefficients, our main findings
can be summarised as follows. Focusing on the degree of market power, all estimated models show
that the price to marginal cost ratio is significantly larger than one, hence supporting the hypothesis
of imperfect competition in the output market. This result confirms the findings of Bughin (1996)
and Konings et al. (2001) who provide evidence of non-competitive pricing strategies in the
Belgian manufacturing industry. Our estimates of the price-cost mark-up range from 20 to 49
percent. The results of Model 1 are in line with those of Martins et al. (1996) who find that the
                                                                                                                                                                               
15 Assuming that the idiosyncratic component of the productivity shock (
it
u ) is white noise, taking first (logarithmic) differences
introduces errors that have a moving average structure of order one. For this reason, legitimate instruments are dated (t-2) or earlier.
16 In the paper, we report the second-step (optimal) GMM estimates. Our first-step estimates affect the precision of the estimates but
confirm our main conclusions about the signs and significance of the parameters.
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average mark-up for Belgian manufacturing over the period 1980-1992 is about 18 percent.17 They
also accord with the estimates of Konings et al. (2001) who point to a mark-up ratio of 1.27 for
large firms in the Belgian manufacturing industry over the period 1994-1996.
As far as the nature of returns to scale is concerned, Model 2 and Model 4 support the
hypothesis of increasing returns to scale: the coefficient on ∆k  is significantly larger than zero in
both models (point estimates of 0.165 and 0.099 respectively). The estimated scale elasticity is
1.228 (Model 2) and 1.147 (Model 4).18
We now turn to discussing the potential relationship between labour market imperfections
and product market imperfections, as implied by the estimates of Model 3 and Model 4. First of all,
we notice that the new variable which accounts for union bargaining power, is strongly significant
when entering the models. The estimates of Model 3 point to a significant union bargaining power
of 0.285 on a scale going from 0 to 1. In Model 4 the estimated bargaining power parameter is
0.244. These results reject the hypothesis that workers have no influence over employment, which
is consistent with the idea that wages are bargained off the conventional labour demand curve.
Hence, our findings accord with stylised facts about Belgian industrial relations19 and confirm
those of Bughin (1993) who rejects the Right-To-Manage model in favour of the Efficient
Bargaining model for Belgium. Our estimates are somewhat higher than the value of union power
(0.1) obtained by Goos and Konings (2001) for Belgium during the period 1987-1994. However,
their empirical analysis boils down to estimating a Right-To-Manage model in which the elasticity
of wages with respect to profits per employee measures the bargaining strength of the workers. In
contrast, our analysis rejects the fact that union power does not affect the labour share.
The price-cost mark-up parameter is significantly higher than the estimates obtained from
Model 1 and Model 2. Model 3 implies a significant price to marginal cost ratio of 1.350 compared
to an estimate of 1.196 when labour market imperfections are ignored. In Model 4, the price-cost
ratio increases to 1.488 compared with 1.381 when ignoring union bargaining power. Our findings
are hence qualitatively consistent with those of Crépon et al. (2002). Using a panel of 1026 French
manufacturing firms over the period 1986-1992, price-cost mark-ups are found to be about 40
percent and union bargaining power is estimated at about 0.60. Ignoring imperfect competition in
the labour market brings the price-cost mark-up estimate down to 10 percent.
                                                          
17 These authors apply Roeger’s (1995) method, however, which uses the ‘Solow residual to estimate price-cost mark-ups.
18 Note that the finding of increasing returns to scale is not driven by the inclusion of many small firms in our sample. Restricting the
analysis to firms with more than 50 employees or firms with more than 100 employees still supports the hypothesis of increasing returns
to scale.
19 Belgian collective agreements do not only deal with wages but also with employment issues like hours of work and part-time labour
policies (Bughin, 1996).
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Table 2   General Results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
REDUCED  FORM  PARAMETERS
Constant 0.0002(0.002)
-0.009**
(0.004)
-0.002
(0.003)
-0.009**
(0.004)
Output  per  Capital
∆(q - k)
0.164***
(0.030)
0.276***
(0.049)
0.259***
(0.046)
0.328***
(0.050)
Capital
∆k
0.165***
(0.032)
0.099***
(0.037)
Share-weighted
Labour  per  Capital
N(α - 1) ∆(n - k)
0.398***
(0.066)
0.322***
(0.070)
STRUCTURAL  PARAMETERS
Mark-up

1.196***
(0.043)
1.381***
(0.093)
1.350***
(0.084)
1.488***
(0.111)
Scale Elasticity
1+ 
1 1.228
***
(0.044) 1
1.147***
(0.055)
Workers’ Barg. Power

0.285***
(0.034)
0.244***
(0.040)
SPECIFICATION  TESTS
Sargan IV Test  ~ 2df 47.019 50.926 34.330 31.206
df 41 43 43 42
p-value 0.240 0.190 0.825 0.889
SOC  ~ 0 1N ( , ) 0.209 0.159 -0.051 -0.200
# Obs. 28132 28132 28132 28132
# Firms 7086 7086 7086 7086
***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses.
(1) Sample period: 1988-1995.
(2) Dependent variable: Solow Residual,  (1 ) .             
it Nit it Mit it Nit Mit it
SR q n m k
(3) The equations are estimated in levels as the specifications are in differenced logs, i.e. growth rates.
(4) Sargan IV Test: two-step estimates Sargan test of correlation among instruments and residuals, asymptotically distributed as 2df .
The null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid.
(5) SOC: test for 2nd-order serial correlation (SOC) in the first-difference error term. This test statistic is asymptotically distributed as
0 1, .( )N  The null hypothesis is that there is no second order serial correlation in the first-difference error term.
(6) Instruments used are: ∆n, ∆m and ∆k,  all dated (t-2) and earlier.
(7) Time dummies are included as regressors and instruments in all equations.
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In the specifications mentioned above, firm-level data are deflated by a common industry
price index at the three-digit level of sectoral disaggregation. Output price differences between
firms are hence not taken into account, they show up in the error term. This may give rise to
downwardly biased and inconsistent estimates of price-cost mark-up and scale coefficients if output
price differences between firms within an industry are endogenous and correlated with the
explanatory variables in the model (changes in factor inputs and factor shares).20 This problem
might arise when firms compete in an environment with differentiated products. To address this
issue, we have adopted the solution suggested by Klette and Griliches (1996) which amounts to
adding the growth in industry output as an additional regressor. Theoretically, this solution relies
on the assumption that the market power of firms originates from product differentiation.
Intuitively, in the case of product differentiation, the demand for an individual firm’s products is a
function of its relative price within the industry. Relative price differences can then be expressed in
terms of relative output growth differences in the industry. In contrast to Klette and Griliches
(1996) and Crépon et al. (2002), we find that the growth of industry output is not statistically
significant in the empirical specifications.21 Moreover, its inclusion has no effect on the estimated
values of the other coefficients. Our results hence suggest that the main source of the market power
of Belgian manufacturing firms is not in product differentiation but rather corresponds to other
forms of imperfect competition.
6.3.    Sectoral Analysis
To take into account heterogeneity among sectors, we disaggregate the Belgian
manufacturing industry into 20 two-digit sectors and estimate the four models for each sector. Due
to data limitations and econometric problems, we had to restrict the analysis to 18 sectors. For all
reported results, the test statistics cannot reject absence of second-order serial correlation in the
differenced error term. Moreover, on the basis of the Sargan test we can never reject the null
hypothesis that our instruments are valid. Table 3 and Table 4 report the results for Model 1 and
Model 2 respectively. With the exception of the milk and dairy products sector (sector 11), the ratio
of price over marginal cost is significantly larger than one at the 1% level for all sectors. The
estimated mark-up ratio of Model 1 ranges from 0.992 to 1.471. This range seems plausible and is
also in line with the findings of Martins et al. (1996) and Konings et al. (2001).
We can group sectors according to the magnitude of the estimated price-cost mark-ups.
Relatively high mark-ups (22-47 percent) appear in sectors such as ferrous and non-ferrous ores
                                                          
20 However, we argue that this downward bias is less severe in our estimations since we use a price index defined at the three-digit level
of sectoral disaggregation as deflator (instead of an industry-wide deflator). In other words, we allow for a relatively high degree of price
variability within the manufacturing industry as a whole as well as within the manufacturing sectors defined at the two-digit level of
sectoral disaggregation.
21 These results are not reported but available upon request.
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and metals, non-metallic mineral products, agricultural and industrial machinery, office and data
processing machines, precision and optical instruments, other transport equipment, beverages and
rubber and plastic products. On the other hand, the estimated mark-up ratio is relatively low (0.992-
1.156) in the sectors producing metal products except machinery and transport equipment, meat
preparations and preserves, milk and dairy products, textiles and clothing, and other manufacturing
products.
When taking into account the influence of returns to scale, the mark-up ratio ranges from
0.991 to 1.808. The scale elasticity varies from 1 to 1.734, pointing to constant and increasing
returns to scale. The higher the scale elasticity, the larger the increase in and the level of the price
over marginal cost ratio compared to Model 1. The ranking of sectors according to the estimated
price over marginal cost ratio remains largely the same.
Although high price-cost mark-ups may be indicative of a lack of competition in the sector,
they cannot be considered as persistent rents resulting from market power. In innovative sectors,
for example, high mark-ups may be the result of temporary innovation rents. Sunk costs may also
necessitate mark-up pricing.
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Table 3   Sector Analysis: Model 1
Code Name # Obs.(# Firms)
Output  per  Capital
∆(q - k)
Mark-up

Sec 1 13 Ferrous and non-ferrous ores and metals,other than radioactive
331
(74)
0.217***
(0.004)
1.277***
(0.007)
Sec 2 15 Non-metallic mineral products 2359 (562)
0.183***
(0.031)
1.224***
(0.046)
Sec 3 17 Chemical products 1452(319)
0.170***
(0.024)
1.205***
(0.035)
Sec 4 19 Metal products except machinery andtransport equipment
3649
(1014)
0.135***
(0.051)
1.156***
(0.068)
Sec 5 21 Agricultural and industrial machinery 1504(399)
0.185***
(0.028)
1.227***
(0.042)
Sec 6 23 Office and data processing machines,precision and optical instruments
448
 (130)
0.198***
(0.030)
1.247***
(0.047)
Sec 7 25 Electrical goods 992(267)
0.165***
(0.024)
1.198***
(0.034)
Sec 8 27 Motor vehicles 426 (111)
0.148***
(0.021)
1.174***
(0.029)
Sec 9 29 Other transport equipment 230(64)
0.320***
(0.011)
1.471***
(0.024)
Sec 10 31 Meat preparations and preserves, otherproducts from slaughtered animals
929
(214)
0.061***
(0.013)
1.065***
(0.015)
Sec 11 33 Milk and dairy products 264(66)
-0.008**
(0.004)
0.992***
(0.004)
Sec 12 35 Other food products 3320(834)
0.168***
(0.048)
1.202***
(0.069)
Sec 13 37 Beverages 397(88)
0.227***
(0.006)
1.294***
(0.010)
Sec 14 39 Tobacco products na na
Sec 15 41 Textiles and clothing 3200(783)
0.125***
(0.040)
1.143***
(0.052)
Sec 16 43 Leathers, leather and skin goods,footwear na na
Sec 17 45 Timber, wooden products and furniture 2641(668)
0.147***
(0.030)
1.172***
(0.041)
Sec 18 47 Paper and printing products 3585(926)
0.167***
(0.027)
1.200***
(0.039)
Sec 19 49 Rubber and plastic  products 1337322)
0.239***
(0.021)
1.314***
(0.036)
Sec 20 51 Other manufacturing products 570 (163)
0.125***
(0.014)
1.143***
(0.018)
  Time dummies are included but not reported. Standard errors in parentheses.
  ***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%.
  Instruments: ∆n, m and ∆k,  all dated (t-2) and earlier.
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Table 4   Sector Analysis: Model 2
# Obs.
(# Firms)
Output  per  Capital
∆(q - k)
Capital
∆k
Mark-up

Scale Elasticity
1+ 
Sec 1 331
(74)
0.240***
(0.004)
0.041***
(0.006)
1.316***
(0.007)
1.054***
(0.008)
Sec 2 2359 (562)
0.329***
(0.043)
0.227***
(0.041)
1.490***
(0.096)
1.338***
(0.061)
Sec 3 1452(319)
0.276***
(0.043)
0.116***
(0.041)
1.381***
(0.082)
1.160***
(0.057)
Sec 4 3649(1014)
0.319***
(0.062)
0.203***
(0.045)
1.468***
(0.134)
1.298***
(0.066)
Sec 5 1504(399)
0.388***
(0.034)
0.350***
(0.042)
1.634***
(0.091)
1.572***
(0.069)
Sec 6 448 (130)
0.330***
(0.053)
0.223***
(0.067)
1.493***
(0.118)
1.333***
(0.100)
Sec 7 992(267)
0.285***
(0.031)
0.152***
(0.029)
1.399***
(0.061)
1.213***
(0.041)
Sec 8 426 (111)
0.173***
(0.026)
0.026
(0.031)
1.209***
(0.038)
1***
(0.037)
Sec 9 230(64)
0.447***
(0.018)
0.406***
(0.032)
1.808***
(0.059)
1.734***
(0.058)
Sec 10 929(214)
0.060***
(0.022)
-0.0003
(0.024)
1.064***
(0.027)
1***
(0.026)
Sec 11 264(66)
-0.009**
(0.004)
-0.003
(0.004)
0.991***
(0.004)
1***
(0.004)
Sec 12 3320(834)
0.386***
(0.083)
0.256***
(0.080)
1.629***
(0.220)
1.417***
(0.130)
Sec 13 397(88)
0.235***
(0.009)
0.016
(0.011)
1.307***
(0.015)
1***
(0.014)
Sec 14 na na na na
Sec 15 3200(783)
0.184***
(0.045)
0.127***
(0.040)
1.225***
(0.068)
1.156***
(0.049)
Sec 16 na na na na
Sec 17 2641(668)
0.354***
(0.053)
0.212***
(0.045)
1.548***
(0.127)
1.328***
(0.070)
Sec 18 3585(926)
0.322***
(0.045)
0.172***
(0.042)
1.475***
(0.098)
1.254***
(0.062)
Sec 19 1337322)
0.369***
(0.034)
0.192***
(0.045)
1.585***
(0.085)
1.304***
(0.071)
Sec 20 570 (163)
0.209***
(0.020)
0.115***
(0.016)
1.264***
(0.032)
1.145***
(0.020)
  Time dummies are included but not reported. Standard errors in parentheses.
  ***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%.
  Instruments: ∆n, m and ∆k,  all dated (t-2) and earlier.
Focusing on the relationship between labour market imperfections and product market
imperfections leads to following insights (see Table 5 and Table 6). In Model 3, the estimated
mark-up ratio ranges from 1.017 to 2.088 and the bargaining power parameter varies from 0.042 to
0.394. Our estimates of union bargaining power accord with those of Vandenbussche et al. (2001),
who estimate bargaining power coefficients for NACE three-digit sectors over de period 1987-
1994. Model 4 points to a range of 1-2.268 for the estimated mark-up ratio and 0.051-0.400 for
union bargaining power.
For each sector, we find evidence of price-cost mark-ups being underestimated when
imperfection in the labour market is ignored, hence, validating the findings of Bughin (1996). The
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higher the bargaining power of the workers in a sector, the higher the level of and the increase in
the estimated price over marginal cost ratio. This allows us again to split up sectors according to
the magnitude of both the mark-up ratio and union bargaining power. Concentrating on Model 3,
the correlation between the estimated mark-up ratio and the union bargaining power parameter is
0.872. Sectors such as metal products except machinery and transport equipment, office and data
processing machines, precision and optical instruments, electrical goods, other transport equipment
and rubber and plastic products are characterised by a relatively high mark-up ratio (range of
1.502-2.088) and relatively high union bargaining power (range of 0.260-0.394). The sector office
and data processing machines, precision and optical instruments can be labelled as the sector with
both the highest price-cost mark-up and the highest union bargaining power parameter. Sectors
such as non-metallic mineral products, chemical products, motor vehicles, other food products,
beverages, paper and printing products and other manufacturing products can be classified as
sectors with moderate price-cost mark-ups (range of 1.282-1.493) and moderate union bargaining
power (range of 0.094-0.237). Sectors producing meat preparations and preserves and milk and
dairy products display a relatively low price over marginal cost ratio (range of 1.017-1.125) and
relatively low union bargaining power (range of 0.042-0.050). The lowest mark-up ratio as well as
the lowest union bargaining power parameter is found in the milk and dairy products sector. Model
4 produces similar results. The correlation between the estimated mark-up ratio and the union
bargaining power parameter is 0.714.22
                                                          
22 The highest estimated price-cost mark-up ratio equals 2.268 (sec 9). As mentioned before, sunk costs may explain part of this high
estimate.
JOINT ESTIMATION OF PRICE-COST MARGINS AND UNION BARGAINING POWER                                           23
Table 5   Sector Analysis: Model 3
# Obs.
(# Firms)
Output  per  Capital
∆(q - k)
Share-weighted
Labour  per  Capital
N(α - 1) ∆(n - k)
Mark-up

Workers’ Barg.
Power

Sec 1 331
(74)
0.265***
(0.009)
0.104***
(0.016)
1.361***
(0.017)
0.094***
(0.013)
Sec 2 2359 (562)
0.305***
(0.034)
0.259***
(0.043)
1.439***
(0.070)
0.206***
(0.027)
Sec 3 1452(319)
0.315***
(0.033)
0.221***
(0.045)
1.460***
(0.070)
0.181***
(0.030)
Sec 4 3649(1014)
0.342***
(0.054)
0.359***
(0.059)
1.520***
(0.125)
0.264***
(0.032)
Sec 5 1504(399)
0.312***
(0.024)
0.411***
(0.044)
1.453***
(0.051)
0.291***
(0.022)
Sec 6 448 (130)
0.521***
(0.043)
0.651***
(0.054)
2.088***
(0.187)
0.394***
(0.020)
Sec 7 992(267)
0.334***
(0.019)
0.363***
(0.033)
1.502***
(0.043)
0.266***
(0.018)
Sec 8 426 (111)
0.243***
(0.021)
0.187***
(0.033)
1.321***
(0.037)
0.158***
(0.023)
Sec 9 230(64)
0.502***
(0.019)
0.464***
(0.071)
2.008***
(0.077)
0.317***
(0.008)
Sec 10 929(214)
0.088***
(0.020)
0.035**
(0.018)
1.096***
(0.024)
0.034**
(0.017)
Sec 11 264(66)
0.017***
(0.005)
0.044***
(0.005)
1.017***
(0.005)
0.042***
(0.005)
Sec 12 3320(834)
0.307***
(0.051)
0.284***
(0.062)
1.443***
(0.106)
0.221***
(0.038)
Sec 13 397(88)
0.289***
(0.008)
0.154***
(0.009)
1.406***
(0.016)
0.133***
(0.007)
Sec 14 na na na na
Sec 15 3200(783)
0.260***
(0.045)
0.310***
(0.059)
1.351***
(0.082)
0.237***
(0.034)
Sec 16 na na na na
Sec 17 2641(668)
0.330***
(0.043)
0.264***
(0.049)
1.493***
(0.096)
0.209***
(0.031)
Sec 18 3585(926)
0.306***
(0.038)
0.263***
(0.057)
1.441***
(0.079)
0.208***
(0.036)
Sec 19 1337322)
0.396***
(0.027)
0.351***
(0.048)
1.656***
(0.074)
0.260***
(0.026)
Sec 20 570 (163)
0.220***
(0.027)
0.206***
(0.030)
1.282***
(0.044)
0.171***
(0.021)
  Time dummies are included but not reported. Standard errors in parentheses.
  ***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%.
  Instruments: ∆n, m and ∆k,  all dated (t-2) and earlier.
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Table 6   Sector Analysis: Model 4
# Obs.
(# Firms)
Output  per
Capital
∆(q - k)
Capital
∆k
Share-weighted
Labour  per  Capital
N(α - 1) ∆(n - k)
Mark-up

 Scale
Elasticity
1+ 
Workers’
Barg. Power

Sec 1 331(74)
0.268***
(0.010)
-0.012
(0.012)
0.117***
(0.020)
1.366***
(0.019)
1***
(0.016)
0.105***
(0.016)
Sec 2 2359(562)
0.356***
(0.039)
0.152***
(0.055)
0.156***
(0.060)
1.553***
(0.094)
1.236***
(0.085)
0.135***
(0.045)
Sec 3 1452 (319)
0.325***
(0.043)
0.017
(0.044)
0.213***
(0.050)
1.481***
(0.094)
1***
(0.065)
0.176***
(0.034)
Sec 4 3649(1014)
0.387***
(0.058)
0.106**
(0.051)
0.275***
(0.069)
1.631***
(0.154)
1.173***
(0.083)
0.216***
(0.042)
Sec 5 1504(399)
0.386***
(0.029)
0.185***
(0.051)
0.272***
(0.062)
1.629***
(0.077)
1.301***
(0.083)
0.214***
(0.038)
Sec 6 448(130)
0.521***
(0.047)
0.008
(0.046)
0.668***
(0.058)
2.088***
(0.204)
1***
(0.096)
0.400***
(0.021)
Sec 7 992(267)
0.382***
(0.025)
0.101***
(0.033)
0.313***
(0.045)
1.618***
(0.065)
1.163***
(0.053)
0.238***
(0.026)
Sec 8 426(111)
0.235***
(0.025)
-0.006
(0.029)
0.186***
(0.034)
1.307***
(0.043)
1***
(0.038)
0.157***
(0.024)
Sec 9 230(64)
0.559***
(0.015)
0.311***
(0.034)
0.301***
(0.030)
2.268***
(0.077)
1.705***
(0.077)
0.231***
(0.018)
Sec 10 929(214)
0.068***
(0.025)
-0.042
(0.029)
0.052**
(0.024)
1.073***
(0.029)
1***
(0.031)
0.049**
(0.022)
Sec 11 264(66)
0.006
(0.004)
-0.028***
(0.007)
0.054***
(0.006)
1***
(0.004)
0.972***
(0.007)
0.051***
(0.005)
Sec 12 3320(834)
0.359***
(0.073)
0.096
(0.095)
0.220***
(0.080)
1.560***
(0.178)
1***
(0.148)
0.180***
(0.060)
Sec 13 397 (88)
0.254***
(0.011)
-0.093***
(0.016)
0.213***
(0.012)
1.340***
(0.020)
0.875***
(0.021)
0.176***
(0.008)
Sec 14 na na na na na na
Sec 15 3200
 (783)
0.284***
(0.048)
0.057
(0.040)
0.285***
(0.064)
1.397***
(0.094)
1***
(0.056)
0.222***
(0.039)
Sec 16 na na na na na na
Sec 17 2641 (668)
0.386***
(0.050)
0.130***
(0.052)
0.154***
(0.065)
1.629***
(0.133)
1.212***
(0.085)
0.133***
(0.050)
Sec 18 3585 (926)
0.340***
(0.044)
0.107**
(0.047)
0.142**
(0.070)
1.515***
(0.101)
1.162***
(0.071)
0.124***
(0.050)
Sec 19 1337(322)
0.407***
(0.031)
0.042
(0.048)
0.319***
(0.059)
1.686***
(0.088)
1***
(0.081)
0.242***
(0.034)
Sec 20 570(163)
0.226***
(0.031)
0.005
(0.026)
0.206***
(0.032)
1.292***
(0.052)
1***
(0.034)
0.171***
(0.022)
  Time dummies are included but not reported. Standard errors in parentheses.
  ***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%.
  Instruments: ∆n, m and ∆k,  all dated (t-2) and earlier.
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7.     CONCLUSIONS AND INTERPRETATION
This paper analyses price-setting behaviour in both the product and the labour market of
Belgian manufacturing firms over the period 1988-1995. By embedding an Efficient Bargaining
model into Hall’s (1988) framework, we are able to estimate price-cost mark-up and union
bargaining power parameters simultaneously. Applying the Generalised Method of Moments
(GMM) technique for panel data, our results strongly reject perfect competition in both the output
and the labour market. Assuming constant returns to scale, price-cost mark-ups are estimated at 35
percent and the union bargaining power parameter is found to be about 0.29. Ignoring labour
market imperfections brings the estimated price-cost mark-up down to 20 percent. In this respect,
our results qualitatively accord with the findings of Crépon et al. (2002).
To examine the important issue of heterogeneity in the price-cost mark-up and in union
bargaining power, we have split up the sample into 18 sectors. For each sector separately, we find
that neglecting imperfection in the labour market causes a significant underestimation in the price-
cost mark-up. By focusing on the cross-section dimension, we are able to draw conclusions about
the interdependencies between the two parameters. A new result in this paper concerns the
remarkable positive relationship that we observe among sectors between estimated union
bargaining power and estimated price-cost margins, evaluated at perfect competition in the labour
market. In other words, labour market and product market imperfections are likely to go hand in
hand. This observed positive correlation can be interpreted in two ways.
One interpretation runs from labour market imperfections to product market imperfections.
This interpretation follows from the long-run implications of the theoretical model set out in
section 2.2. The mechanism through which that happens can be described as follows. Strong unions
increase unemployment, thereby decreasing the reservation wage. The resulting higher wage rents
imply a lower proportion of rents left to the firm. This change in the factor income distribution
ultimately forces firms to exit the market, thereby decreasing product market competition. The
lower reservation wage leads to a higher price-cost mark-up (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003). This
increases the surplus available for sharing between the workers and the firm. The more powerful
the union, the larger the size of the surplus that can be shared and the larger the part of the surplus
going to the workers. Our framework does not allow us, however, to evaluate the effect of strong
unions on the size of the surplus accruing to the firm. Theoretically, our findings are hence
consistent with the hypothesis that unions may depress profits as well as with the hypothesis that
unions do not affect profitability or even increase profitability.23
                                                          
23 Estimating a structural model, which endogenises wages, for the European airline industry over the period 1976-1994, Neven et al.
(2002) find that unions exert a small but positive effect on prices and on the true price-cost mark-up. The small impact is due to the
quantitatively small effect of rent sharing on marginal costs, suggesting that rent sharing is mostly about redistribution.   
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Alternatively, the results can be interpreted in terms of the effect of product market
imperfections on labour market imperfections. Following this reasoning, firms with higher price-
cost margins might employ high-skilled workers who are harder to replace than low-skilled
workers.24 In that case, monopoly power in the product market would also be associated with
higher union bargaining power. Another explanation going from product market imperfections to
labour market imperfections results from the fact that unions are unlikely to organise and to survive
unless they are able to extract some surplus from firms and this is most likely the case when there
is imperfect competition in the product market.
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